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I. CHALLENGING THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE AS A 
UNION BETWEEN DIFFERENT-SEX PERSONS 
 
On May 11th this year, the Italian Parliament passed a law introducing civil 
unions for same-sex couples (Law 2016, no 76).1 The adoption of a specific 
legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of same-sex 
unions in Italy could no longer be postponed, especially after the Strasbourg 
Court (ECtHR), in Oliari and Others v Italy,2 had found that the latter had 
violated article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
failing to recognize and to protect same-sex unions in its national legal 
system. 
 
The new law does not extend the right to marry to same-sex couples, but at 
least provides them with many rights previously reserved to married couples 
(e.g. rights related to social welfare, to tax law, to labour law, to migration law, 
etc). The main difference between marriage (for different-sex couples) and 
civil union (for same-sex couples) remains that a child born during a civil 
union is not a child of the couple, but only a child of the biological parent. 
Moreover, the new law explicitly excludes same-sex couples from the 
possibility of jointly adopting a child, while it does not provide anything with 
regard to stepchild adoption (i.e, the adoption by one partner of the other 
same-sex partner's child) which – although with great difficulty – is beginning 
to be recognized by the Italian courts. Furthermore, the sole fact that the 
institution of marriage is still reserved to different-sex couples and is not 
open to same-sex couples might be considered discriminatory in itself and 
might constitute an obstacle to the free movement of same-sex couples. 
 
It should be clarified, from the outset, that the new Italian law on civil unions 
does not address in detail the issue of recognition in Italy of same-sex 
marriages concluded abroad. Rather, it delegates the regulation of this 
subject to the Italian Government in accordance with the principle that the 
Italian regulation on civil unions will be applicable to same-sex couples who 
                                                 
1 Legge 20 Maggio 2016, no 76, Regolamentazione delle unioni civili tra persone dello 
stesso sesso e disciplina delle convivenze, Italian Official Journal no 118 of 21 May 
2016. 
2 Oliari and others v Italy, Apps nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 21 July 2015). 
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have celebrated a marriage, or a civil union, or a comparable form of 
partnership abroad. This implies that a same-sex marriage celebrated abroad 
will only produce the effects of a civil union in Italy with the consequent 
downgrading of the couple's rights. 
 
The aim of this paper is not to analyse the specific provisions of the Italian 
law on civil unions. Rather, the paper aims to challenge the traditional 
concept of marriage, as a union between persons of opposite-sex, which until 
now has underpinned the Italian policy of registration of same-sex marriages 
celebrated abroad and still constitutes the rationale of the new Italian law on 
civil unions. 
 
To this end, I will explore the interplay of rules on freedom of movement of 
persons and human rights on the recognition of civil status records. First of 
all, in Section II, I will pay attention to the principle of non-discrimination 
and to the rules relating to the free movement of persons within the territory 
of EU Member States as enshrined in articles 18 and 21 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Thus, I will assess the extent to 
which those principles represent a real duty on every EU Member to 
recognize the family status created in another Member State. Secondly, in 
Section III, I will analyse the ECtHR's case law which established that a 
status validly created abroad might be entitled to protection under human 
rights law and, in particular, under the right to respect for private and family 
life as covered by article 8 ECHR. It is not evident whether this case law 
might also be applied to ensure an automatic recognition of a same-sex 
marriage celebrated abroad. 
 
In Section IV, I will examine the evolution of recent Italian case law relating 
to the Italian policy of registration of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad. 
I can anticipate that the number of judicial decisions in favour of the 
recognition of same-sex marriages concluded abroad is limited. However, 
some openings can be identified in this case law and their importance is 
shown by the circumstance that they convinced more and more same-sex 
couples to seek the recognition of their marriage celebrated abroad, and to 
challenge the refusal to record through legal action. 
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The increasing litigation certainly reflects the societal evolution and, 
together with other signals that I will explore in Section V, shows that the 
way same-sex is perceived in Italy is gradually changing.  
 
In my opinion, even after the adoption of the recent Italian law on civil 
unions, the (national and supranational) legal framework fails to solve all the 
problems. Nonetheless, in Section VI, I will conclude that the results 
achieved through this paper show that in order to eradicate any 
discrimination against same-sex couples, a bottom-up approach generated by 
individuals' behaviours and their attempts to seek recognition of their rights, 
could force the current normative context and push towards the gradual 
erosion of the traditional concept of marriage as a union between different-
sex persons. 
 
II. THE EU AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 
 
The development of EU law is the first field that puts pressure on the 
traditional concept of marriage. 
 
The European Union is not endowed with specific competence in 
substantive family matters. Indeed, a dedicated legal basis on family matters 
is only provided in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters. In 
particular, EU institutions, operating under article 81(3) TFEU (and 
previously, on the corresponding article 67 TEC), may establish measures 
concerning family law with cross-border implications. The main instruments 
through which those private international law competences have been 
implemented are represented by the Brussels II Regulation concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters,3 and the Rome III Regulation concerning the law 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 [2003] OJ 
L338/1. 
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applicable to divorce and legal separation.4 However, the lack of a dedicated 
legal basis for substantive family law is not contradicted by the regulation 
concerning family reunification which has been elaborated upon in light of 
the wider goal of the free movement of persons and has allowed the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) to rule on family matters and issues related to same-
sex couples. 
 
With particular reference to the rules on the keeping of civil status records, 
the ECJ has held on several occasions that those rules fall within the 
competence of the individual Member States. However, the ECJ has also 
stated that the exercise of that competence by the Member States must 
comply with EU law and, in particular, should not hinder the principle of non-
discrimination and the rules relating to the free movement of persons as 
enshrined in articles 18 and 21 TFEU.5 
 
In accordance with this view, the ECJ considered that the obligation to 
comply with those objectives may imply that personal status – at least in some 
cases – should not be questioned by the authorities of another Member State. 
 
In particular, in Garcia Avello6 and in Grunkin and Paul7 the ECJ held that the 
failure to recognize a surname legally acquired and registered in another 
Member State is liable to cause serious inconvenience for the Union citizen 
concerned in so far as it constitutes an obstacle to freedom of movement that 
                                                 
4 Council Regulation (EU) 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010] 
OJ L343/10. 
5 On the topic, see Heinz-Peter Mansel, 'The Impact of the European Union's 
Prohibition of Discrimination and the Right of Free Movement of Persons on the 
Private International Law Rules of Member States – With Comments on the Sayn-
Wittgenstein Case before the European Court of Justice' in Katharina Boele-
Woelki et al (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law, Liber 
Amicorum Kurt Siehr (Eleven International Publishing-Schulthess 2010) 291 ff. 
6 Case C-148/02, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State.  
7 Case C-353/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:559, Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul. 
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could be justified only if it was based on objective considerations and was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.8  
 
The principle of non-discrimination has proven particularly effective with 
reference to the rights of same-sex couples who have entered into a registered 
partnership. In particular, in Tadao Maruko,9 in Jürgen Römer10 and in Frédéric 
Hay,11 the ECJ dealt with the interpretation of Directive 2000/7812 whose 
purpose is to combat certain forms of discrimination in the areas of 
employment and occupation, including that on grounds of sexual orientation, 
with a view to putting the principle of equal treatment into effect in the 
Member States. 
 
In all these three cases, according to the ECJ, the assessment of 
discriminatory treatment was subject to the condition that the person who 
entered into a same-sex registered partnership in the Member State 
concerned could be considered in a legal and factual situation comparable to 
that of a married person. According to the ECJ, the assessment of that 
comparability must not be carried out in a global and abstract manner and 
must not consist of examining whether national law generally and 
comprehensively treats registered partnership as legally equivalent to 
marriage. Rather, the assessment must be carried out in a specific and 
concrete manner in the light of the right concerned. It is evident from the 
                                                 
8 Considerations of public policy such as the prohibition of title of nobility or the need 
to respect the national identity of a Member State, which includes protection of a 
State's official national language, have been considered legitimate objectives capable 
of justifying restriction of the recognition of a surname and, thus, to the freedom of 
movement and residence enjoyed by citizens of the Union. See Case C-208/09, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:806, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien; Case 
C-391/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291, Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn, Łukasz Paweł Wardyn. 
9 Case C-267/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der 
deutschen Bühnen. 
10 Case C-147/08, ECLI:EU:C:2011:286, Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt 
Hamburg. 
11 Case C-267/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:823, Frédéric Hay v Crédit agricole mutuel de 
Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sèvres (ECJ 12 December 2013). 
12 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 
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reasoning of the ECJ that the right of every EU Member State to decide 
whether the registered partnerships have to be treated as equivalent to 
marriage remains unaffected. 
 
However, the case law concerning the interpretation of Directive 2000/78 
that I just mentioned, deals with EU social policy and in particular with 
situations where the parties did not exercise their right of free movement 
within the European Union. In contrast, in my view, when the right to 
freedom of movement is at stake, it is more difficult to admit that EU 
Member States hold an absolute discretionary power to decide whether (and 
to what extent) to recognize the effects of a same-sex registered partnership 
or even of a same-sex marriage celebrated in another EU Member State. 
 
In fact, the refusal to recognize the status created in another Member State 
could represent an obstacle to the free movement of persons and thus would 
hinder one of the fundamental goals of EU integration. For this reason, it 
should be stressed that it is possible to affirm the existence of a real duty on 
each EU Member to recognize the personal or family status created in 
another Member State.13 However, the extent of such a duty requires 
clarification. In my opinion, it seems reasonable that some authors specify 
that the requested Member State may refuse to recognize the status created 
abroad in case the relevant situation has no connection to the State of origin 
or in the case of a breach of a concerned State's public policy.14 In fact, I think 
that this approach is in line with the ECJ's case law on mutual recognition of 
surnames duly acquired in another Member State to which I referred above. 
In that context, the ECJ has warned that an obstacle to the freedom of 
movement of persons might be justified where it is based on objective 
considerations and is proportionate to the legitimate objective of the 
                                                 
13 See, eg, Roberto Baratta, 'Problematic elements of an implicit rule providing for 
mutual recognition of personal and family status in the EC' [2007] IPRax 4; Laura 
Tomasi, La tutela degli status familiari nel diritto dell'Unione europea (CEDAM 2007) 
95 ff, 235 ff. 
14 This cautious approach is recommended by Christian Kohler, 'Towards the 
Recognition of Civil Status in the European Union' (2013-2014) 15 YB Priv Intl L 13, 
26-7. 
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national provisions.15 In particular, considerations relating to public policy 
might justify the national restrictive measure and thus the refusal to 
recognize the status created abroad. However, the ECJ stressed that the 
concept of public order must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot 
be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any oversight by 
the European Union institutions.16 
 
The sensitive nature of this issue is confirmed by the cautious approach taken 
by the EU institutions. In fact, whilst the importance of facilitating mutual 
recognition of civil status has been repeatedly underlined in various non-
binding documents,17 it has also been specified that an automatic recognition 
might be better suited to certain civil status situations such as the attribution 
or change of surnames, and might prove to be more complicated in other civil 
status situations such as marriage.18 Moreover, it is significant that when 
drawing up the proposal for a Regulation concerning the simplification of the 
circulation of certain public documents, the prospect of introducing a 
mechanism to automatically recognize civil status certificates issued by other 
EU Member States was considered too ambitious, and therefore it was 
decided – at least for now – not to address the issue of the effects of public 
documents between the Member States.19 
 
The EU institutions have not taken – to date – a strong stand in favour of 
recognition of same-sex couples even when they regulated family 
reunification.  
                                                 
15 Sayn-Wittgenstein (fn 8) para 81 and the case law there cited. 
16 ibid, para 86. 
17 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and 
future orientations {SEC(2004)680 and SEC(2004)693}, COM(2004) 401 final of 2 
June 2004, p 11; European Parliament, Resolution of 23 November 2010 on civil law, 
commercial law, family law and private international law aspects of the Action Plan 
Implementing the Stockholm Programme (2010/2080(INI)), P7_TA(2010)0426 
para 40; Green Paper, Less bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free movement of 
public documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records, COM(2010) 
747 final of 14 December 2010, para 4. 
18 Green Paper (fn 17), para 4.3. 
19 COM(2013) 228 final of 24 April 2013, 6. 
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In particular, Directive 2004/3820 recognizes the right of the spouse or of the 
registered partner of an EU citizen, to move with his (or her) family member, 
or to exercise their right to family reunification within the territory of a 
Member State. But a problem arises, first of all, because the Directive makes 
no further specification regarding the applicability of the concept of 'spouse' 
to same-sex marriage.21 During the preparatory work that led to the final text 
of the Directive, political reasons convinced the EU institutions to avoid any 
further clarification of the concept of spouse and any explicit extension to 
same-sex couples, as that would be unacceptable to certain Member States.22 
The result of that omission is that certain Member States refused to 
recognize the free movement rights of a member of a married same-sex 
couple.23 Secondly, with regard to the reunification of the non-married 
couple the Directive specifies that the partner with whom the Union citizen 
has contracted a registered partnership on the basis of the legislation of a 
Member State, may avail himself (or herself) of the free movement rights 
under the Directive, if the legislation of the host Member State treats 
registered partnerships as being equivalent to marriage and in accordance 
                                                 
20 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) 
1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L158/77. 
21 This issue is dealt with in depth by Scott Titshaw, 'Same-Sex Spouses Lost in 
Translation? How to Interpret "Spouse" in the E.U. Family Migration Directives' 
[2016] Boston U Intl LJ 45. 
22 The original broad approach of the European Commission, according to which the 
term 'spouse' included also same-sex marriages, is evident in the answer that the 
Commission gave to a specific question of the Italian delegate and that can be read 
in Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2001/0111 (COD), no 
15380/01, 18 December 2001, 7. The changing approach and the decision to intend 
the term 'spouse' to refer to heterosexual couples only can be observed in Council of 
the European Union, Interinstitutional File, 2001/0111 (COD), no 10572/02, 10 July 
2002, 11. 
23 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Homophobia and 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the EU Member States: Part I – Legal 
Analysis (2009) <www.fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/192-FRA_hdgso_ 
report_Part%201_en.pdf> 66-7, accessed 28 April 2016. 
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with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member 
State. This means that the Directive leaves it to each Member State to decide 
whether to regulate registered partnership and whether to consider it as 
equivalent to marriage. 
 
Neither of these marriage qualification issues has been addressed by 
Directive 2003/86 (the so-called Family Reunification Directive)24 which 
applies to a third-country national who wants to join his (or her) spouse (also 
a third-country national) when moving to, or within, EU territory. In respect 
of the interpretation of the term 'spouse' in the Family Reunification 
Directive, the arguments I discussed in relation to Directive 2004/38 apply. 
Moreover, the Family Reunification Directive leaves it to the Member States 
to decide whether to authorise the entry and residence of the unmarried 
partner with whom the sponsor is in a duly attested stable long-term 
relationship, or of a third country national who is bound to the sponsor by a 
registered partnership. 
 
With regard to the issue of the qualification of spouse, the ECJ stressed in 
the past that, according to the definition generally accepted by the Member 
States, the term 'marriage' means a union between two persons of the 
opposite-sex.25 However, in this specific case the ECJ had to decide whether 
the refusal to grant a household allowance to a same-sex registered partner 
could be regarded as being discriminatory and did not deal with family 
reunification issues. Furthermore, the statement of the ECJ was rendered in 
2001, when openness to same-sex marriages in the legislation of so many 
Member States had not yet manifested. 
 
For these reasons, the ECJ would probably not decide in the same way a 
request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the term 'spouse' in 
the framework of the free movement of persons in light of the rapid 
development of the concept of marriage seen in a significant number of 
Member States over the past few years. It has been noted that, in principle, 
                                                 
24 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification [2003] OJ L251/12. 
25 Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, D and Kingdom of 
Sweden v Council of the European Union. 
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in such a case, the ECJ could interpret the term 'spouse' according to three 
alternative solutions:26 in accordance with the law under which the marriage 
took place; in accordance with the law of the host State; or adopting an 
autonomous concept of 'spouse'. 
 
In my opinion, although it would be decisive in solving the problem, this last 
alternative risks being perceived as too intrusive. Arguments in favour of the 
first alternative (the application of the law of the country of origin) or in 
favour of the second alternative (the application of the law of the host State) 
could be carried out. Without a doubt, the cautious approach shown by the 
EU institutions in drawing up the Directives 2003/86 and 2004/38 may point 
to qualifying the term 'spouse' according to the law of the host State, which 
would be a solution most respectful of the autonomy of each Member State 
in such a sensitive subject, not delegated to the EU competences. 
 
However, considering that both the Directives tend to ensure the freedom of 
movement of persons and that an increasing number of Member States allow 
for same-sex marriage in their legislation, I think that an evolutive 
interpretation by the ECJ that could favour the free movement of the couple 
– as would be an interpretation of the term 'spouse' according to the law of 
the country of origin – should be preferred. The proposed interpretation 
would make it clear that the choice of a Member State to reserve marriage to 
different-sex persons does not prevent same-sex couples married abroad 
from the right to family reunification. Thus, the right to free movement of 
same-sex couples will be better achieved, with the result that the entry of new 
family models into more traditional countries will become increasingly 
frequent. The increased mobility and the diversification in life models will be 
a catalyst of social change, with the consequence that, at least in the long 
term, the belief of the uselessness of maintaining the traditional concept of 
marriage might exert its influence also at a political and normative level. 
 
  
                                                 
26 See Koen Lenaerts, 'Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the 
European Court of Justice' [2011] Fordham Intl LJ 1338, 1355 ff. 
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III. THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR FAMILY LIFE AND THE 
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CELEBRATED ABROAD 
 
The traditional concept of marriage comes under assault – apart from EU law 
– also from the Strasbourg Court. 
 
In 2010 the ECtHR, in Schalk and Kopf, clearly affirmed for the first time that 
a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership falls within 
the notion of 'family life' for the purpose of the right to respect for private 
and family life as enshrined in article 8 ECHR.27 The Court in Strasbourg 
observed that a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples 
has taken place in many European countries – as proven by the fact that a 
considerable number of them have afforded legal recognition to same-sex 
couples. For this reason, the Court considered it artificial to uphold its 
previous case law according to which same-sex couples only fell under the 
notion of 'private life', and not also under the notion of 'family life' within the 
meaning of article 8 ECHR. The Strasbourg Court stressed that the notion 
of family is no longer confined to the traditional marriage-based relationship 
and may include other de facto families, regardless of whether the relationship 
is established by different-sex or same-sex couples. 
 
In the same judgment, the ECtHR also interpreted the right to marry 
enshrined in article 12 ECHR in the light of article 9 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: the Court stressed that the latter provision has 
deliberately dropped the reference to 'men and women' made by article 12 
ECHR and does not contain any obstacle to recognising same-sex 
relationships in the context of marriage. Marriage should no longer be 
                                                 
27 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010), paras 93-94. With 
regard to the debate on the family life of same-sex couples and their right to marry 
according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see: Ian Curry-
Sumner, 'Same-sex relationships in Europe: Trends Towards Tolerance?' (2011) 3 
Amsterdam Law Forum 43, 56 ff; Paul Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court 
of Human Rights (Routledge 2013) 93 ff and 146 ff; Pietro Pustorino, 'Same-Sex 
Couples Before the ECtHR: The Right to Marriage' in Daniele Gallo and Luca 
Paladini and Pietro Pustorino (eds), Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational 
and International Jurisdiction (Springer 2014), 399. 
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considered to be limited, in all circumstance, to opposite-sex partners.28 
With this interpretation the Strasbourg Court challenged the traditional 
concept of marriage. However, the ECtHR also affirmed that neither article 
12 ECHR nor article 14 ECHR taken in conjunction with article 8 ECHR 
imposes an obligation on the Contracting States to grant same-sex couples 
access to marriage.29 In fact, marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural 
connotations which may differ largely from one society to another and it is 
up to each country to decide whether or not to allow same-sex marriage.30 
 
Whilst the Strasbourg Court reiterated in its subsequent case law that there 
is no obligation to grant access to marriage to same-sex couples, it also 
considered that the interest of a same-sex couple in having the option of 
entering into a form of civil union or registered partnership must be 
protected. Thus, in Oliari and others the Court ruled that a State, like Italy, 
that did not provide a legal framework allowing same-sex couples to have 
their relationship recognised and protected under domestic law, failed to 
comply with the positive obligation to ensure respect for such couples' 
private and family life.31 In my view, it is important to underline that the 
Court arrived to this conclusion after having stressed that from the 
examination of the Italian legal system it followed 'that there exists a conflict 
between the social reality of the applicants, who for the most part live their 
relationship openly in Italy, and the law, which gives them no official 
recognition on the territory'.32 This means that de facto new models of family 
might no longer be ignored and have to be recognized at a legal level. 
 
The case law that I have just explored is obviously important because it shows 
the obligations arising from the ECHR with reference to same-sex couples 
and clarifies that in the ECtHR's view, marriage shall not necessarly be 
reserved to different-sex couples.  
 
                                                 
28 Schalk and Kopf (fn 27), paras 60-61. 
29 ibid, paras 61 and 101. 
30 ibid, para 62. 
31 Oliari (fn 2), para 185. 
32 ibid, para 173. 
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However, the ECtHR has not yet specifically considered whether the right 
to private and family life, as enshrined in article 8 ECHR, could lead to 
affirming the existence of the right to obtain the recognition of same-sex 
couples created abroad. 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth recalling the case law developed as regards the 
recognition of the familial status created abroad through adoption or through 
surrogate motherhood. In particular, in Wagner33 and in Negropontis,34 the 
Strasbourg Court dealt with the recognition of adoptive status and ruled that 
respectively Luxemburg and Greece had violated article 8 ECHR by refusing 
to recognise a foreign order for adoption. In turn, in Mennesson,35 in Labassés36 
and in Paradiso and Campanelli,37 the Strasbourg Court dealt with the 
recognition of the legal parent-child relationship established abroad 
following a surrogacy arrangement and ruled that France (in the first two 
cases) and Italy (in the third case) had violated article 8 ECHR. In these 
particular contexts, the ECtHR established that a status validly created 
abroad might be entitled to protection under human rights law and, in 
particular, under the right to respect for private and/or family life, as covered 
by article 8 ECHR. This protection could not be restricted by the rigid 
application of the rules on the conflict of laws, which, in any case, might not 
be considered a sufficient reason adduced by the national authority to justify 
any interference with the exercise of that right. However, no duty to 
recognize the status created abroad flows automatically or unconditionally 
from article 8 ECHR. In particular, it has been argued that the good faith 
shown by the parties at the moment they acquired the status, and the 
legitimate expectation of stability for that status are preconditions for 
recognition. And the legitimacy of this expectation mainly depends upon the 
strength of the links the position has with the country under which the status 
has been created.38 
                                                 
33 Wagner and J.M.W.L v Luxembourg App no 76240/01 (ECtHR, 28 June 2007). 
34 Negrepontis-Giannisis v Greece App no 56759/08 (ECtHR, 3 May 2011). 
35 Mennesson v France App no 65192/11 (ECtHR, 26 June 2014). 
36 Labassée v France App no 65941/11 (ECtHR, 26 June 2014). 
37 Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy App no 25358/12 (ECtHR, 27 January 2015). 
38 In this view, see Patrick Kinsch, 'Recognition in the Forum of a Status Acquired 
Abroad – Private International Law Rules and European Human Rights Law', in 
2016} Recognition in Italy of Same-Sex Marriages Celebrated Abroad 24 
 
However, the considerations about the nature of the status with which the 
ECtHR has been confronted should not be underestimated: the above-
mentioned cases, despite each having their own different peculiarities, all 
deal with the best interest of the child which the Strasbourg Court 
considered fundamental in order to prove an infringement of article 8 ECHR. 
It is significant that when a similar issue about stability of status has been 
raised with reference to the recognition of a marriage, the Strasbourg Court 
has followed a more cautious approach. In this respect, in Mary Green and 
Ajad Farhat39 the ECtHR dealt with Malta's refusal to recognize the validity 
of a marriage celebrated in Libya by two opposite-sex Maltese citizens who 
had been living together for twenty years. In this case, in view of the interest 
of the national community (in that case, Malta's) in ensuring monogamous 
marriages, and those of the third party directly involved (namely, the first 
husband of the applicant), the ECtHR found that a fair balance of the 
conflicting values need not impose the recognition of the status created 
abroad. 
 
The latter case shows that the stability of the status created abroad is not 
sought at any cost. The host State could object to this value owing to the 
existence of other conflicting internal values that could be considered equally 
important. Deciding the relevance of such conflicting values does not depend 
solely on the host country's degree of acceptance, but may be ruled upon by 
the ECtHR. Without a doubt, the aim of avoiding polygamous marriages 
represents a primary concern on which the ECtHR does not want to 
interfere. Perhaps, in light of the above mentioned case law relating to same-
sex couples and the right to respect for private and family life, the solution 
would be different where the recognition of the status created abroad is 
sought by monogamous same-sex couples. 
 
A confirmation of the pressure on the traditional concept of marriage also 
derives from recent case law concerning the right to family reunification of 
                                                 
Katharina Boele-Woelki et al (eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private 
International Law, Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (Eleven International Publishing-
Schulthess 2010) 259, 273. 
39 Mary Green and Ajad Farhat v Malta App no 38797/07 (ECtHR, 6 July 2010). 
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non-married same-sex couples. In particular, in Taddeucci and McCall,40 the 
ECtHR held that Italy cannot invoke, in any case, its margin of appreciation 
in order to protect the concept of traditional family as a legitimate ground 
capable of justifying a different treatment between different-sex and same-
sex couples. In fact, according to the Court, Italy should have considered that 
same-sex couples are unable to marry in Italy and, consequently, are in a 
different position if compared to non-married opposite-sex couples who 
apply for a residence permit for family reunification. Once again, the 
Strasbourg Court does not impose granting access to marriage to same-sex 
couples, but undeniably puts pressure on the traditional concept of marriage. 
 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN CASE LAW CONCERNING THE 
REGISTRATION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CELEBRATED ABROAD 
 
The evolution of recent Italian case law relating to the Italian policy of 
registration of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad, can be considered, in 
my opinion, a further example of the on-going process of erosion of the 
traditional concept of marriage.41  
 
As observed above, the new Italian Law 2016 no 76 provides for the first time 
a specific legal framework for the recognition and protection of same-sex 
unions. The intervention of the Italian Parliament could no longer be 
postponed in light of the Strasbourg Court pressure to regulate the issue with 
the aim of ensuring respect for such couples' private and family life. At the 
same time, the Italian Parliament intervened in the context of a growing legal 
uncertainty arising from the litigation through which the Italian policy 
against registration of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad had been 
challenged. 
                                                 
40 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy App no 51362/09 (ECtHR, 30 June 2016). 
41 The fundamental role played by national courts in order to increase the acceptability 
of new models of marriage by public opinion and politics is stressed by Angioletta 
Sperti, 'Judicial dialogue and evolutionary interpretations of the Constitutions in 
cases on same-sex marriage and rights of homosexuals couples' (2014) IXth World 
Congress Constitutional Challenges: Global and Local, <http://www. 
jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-events/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/w
ccl/papers/ws5/w5-sperti%20.pdf> accessed 30 December 2015. 
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The first argument against the recognition of a same-sex marriage that can be 
found in Italian case law is based on the lack of an essential element to qualify 
it as a marriage according the Italian legal system: the opposite sex of the two 
spouses. If a marriage does not exist under the Italian legal system, therefore, 
the public Registrar cannot accept the request for registration.42 The need 
for different-sex marriage has been derived from the Italian Constitution as 
well as from other pieces of legislation. Article 29 of the Constitution 
provides that the Italian Republic recognises the rights of the family as a 
natural society founded on marriage. This reference to the natural character 
of the relevant union has been commonly interpreted as implying a choice in 
favour of the traditional relationship between two spouses of different sex.43 
Although there is no legislative rule that expressly provides that a marriage 
must be concluded between spouses of different sex, arguments in favour of 
that solution can be deduced from articles 107 and 108 of the Italian Civil 
Code: both  articles regulate the celebration of the marriage and refer to the 
will of the spouses to become husband and wife. Moreover, a few other 
articles of the Italian Civil Code refer – albeit implicitly – to spouses with 
different sex: to give just one example, article 87 no 3 may be mentioned, 
according to which an uncle and his niece, as well as an aunt and her nephew, 
cannot marry each other. If marriage is only possible between opposite-sex 
                                                 
42 This argument has been used by, for example, the Italian Supreme Court, no 
7877/2000 (albeit only as obiter dictum); the Latina Tribunal, Decree of 10 July 2005; 
Rome's Court of Appeal, 13 July 2006; Venice Tribunal, Order of 3 April 2009. 
43 Regarding the concept of family in the Italian Constitution, see Francesco Dal 
Canto, 'Matrimonio tra omosessuali e principî della Costituzione italiana' (2005) 
Foro It 275. The choice in favour of the traditional relationship between two spouses 
of different sex has been confirmed by the Italian Constitutional Court in its 
judgment no 138/2010 and, more recently, in its judgment no 170/2014. Regarding 
these judgments, see Roberto Romboli, 'La sentenza 138/2010 della Corte 
costituzionale sul matrimonio tra omosessuali e le sue interpretazioni' in Barbara 
Pezzini and Anna Lorenzetti (eds), Unioni e matrimoni same-sex dopo la sentenza 138 del 
2010: quali prospettive? (Jovene 2011) 3; Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, ''Il 
riconoscimento dei matrimoni e delle unioni tra persone dello stesso sesso alla luce 
dei più recenti sviluppi della giurisprudenza costituzionale' [2014] Ordine 
internazionale e diritti umani 629. 
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couples, there is no need for an express prohibition of marriage between an 
uncle and his nephew or between an aunt and her niece.44 
 
The second argument used against the recognition in Italy of same-sex 
marriages concluded abroad avails itself of the typical safeguard of private 
international law as represented by the clause of public policy. In this view, 
same-sex marriage could not be recognised because it would be against 
history, tradition and the cultural fabric of Italian society. This argument was 
used by the Ministry of Home Affairs in its Circulars of 2001 and 2007,45 both 
adopted with the aim of clarifying the rules governing civil status documents, 
and has often been used by the courts as to bolster the above-mentioned non-
existence argument.46 
 
The case law based on the non-existence argument has recently been set aside 
by the Italian Supreme Court. In its Judgment no 4184 of 15 March 2012, 
taking account of the case law of the ECtHR,47 the Supreme Court decided 
that same-sex marriage can no longer be considered non-existent. In fact, as 
I have already stressed, the ECtHR interpreted the right to marry enshrined 
in article 12 ECHR also in the light of article 9 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, as no longer limited, in all circumstances, to marriage 
between two persons of the opposite sex. This breakthrough, in the opinion 
of the Italian Supreme Court, contrasts with the basic premise of the spouses' 
different sexes as a minimum requisite for a marriage.48 The non-existence 
argument, in the view of the Supreme Court, is no longer adequate in the 
current legal reality. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, upheld the 
impossibility of registering a marriage concluded abroad. This outcome is no 
longer a consequence of the non-existence or of the invalidity of the same-sex 
                                                 
44 For references also to other articles of Italian Civil Code, see Franco Mosconi, 
'Europa, famiglia e diritto internazionale privato' (2008) Rivista di diritto 
internazionale 347, 364. 
45 Circular no 2 of 26 March 2001 and Circular no 55 of 18 October 2007. 
46 See, eg, Latina Tribunal, Decree of 10 July 2005. 
47 In particular, the Italian Supreme Court made reference to Schalk and Kopf (fn 27). 
48 Italian Supreme Court para 4.1. 
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marriage, but of its inability to produce – as a marriage – any legal effect in 
the Italian legal system.49 
 
As has already been pointed out, this judgment introduces 'a very 
sophisticated (but unexplained) distinction between a non-existent marriage 
and a marriage that does not produce legal effects'.50 Although the issue is 
controversial, I agree with those who stress that the inability to produce any 
legal effect in the Italian legal system amounts, in substance, to a standard 
consequence that derives in private international law from its incompatibility 
with public policy.51 
 
The inability of same-sex marriages to produce any legal effect in the Italian 
legal system has been confirmed and repeated several times by more recent 
case law.52 However, the non-existence argument has not yet been 
completely abandoned. In fact, recently, the Council of State, after having 
recalled the case law according to which the same-sex marriage is incapable 
of producing any legal effect in the Italian legal system, further argued that, 
in its view, the same-sex marriage might be more appropriately classified as 
non-existent.53 
 
The conclusions that the majority of the Italian case law has thus far reached 
with respect to the registration of same-sex marriages should not be 
interpreted as meaning that this complex issue is closed. In fact, it should be 
noted that the case law is not completely settled.  
 
                                                 
49 Italian Supreme Court para 4.3. 
50 See Giacomo Biagioni, 'On Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriages and 
Partnerships' in Daniele Gallo and Luca Paladini and Pietro Pustorino (eds) (fn 27) 
359, 376. 
51 See Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, 'Il riconoscimento dei matrimoni tra persone 
dello stesso sesso secondo un provvedimento recente del Tribunale di Grosseto' 
[2014] Ordine internazionale e diritti umani 403, 408. 
52 Italian Supreme Court, Judgment no 2400 of 9 February 2015; Regional 
Administrative Court of Lazio, Judgment no 3912 of 9 March 2015; Milan Court of 
Appeal, Decree no 2286 of 6 November 2015; Milan Court of Appeal, Decree no 2543 
of 1 December 2015. 
53 Council of State, Judgment no 4899 of 26 October 2015. 
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In particular, an Order of the Grosseto Tribunal of 9 April 2014 has provoked 
a great deal of discussion.54 This decision, giving its own interpretation of the 
above-mentioned judgment no 4184/2012 of the Italian Supreme Court, 
deduced from it that same-sex marriage can no longer be considered to 
contrast with the public policy clause and, for the first time in Italy, upheld 
the claim of an Italian couple married abroad (in New York), and requested 
that the Registrar record such a marriage.55 
 
In at least one other case, the solution provided by the Grosseto Tribunal has 
been followed and the request for registration accepted by a court. This is the 
case from the Naples Court of Appeal which, in its decision of 31 March 2015, 
relied on the principles of free movement of persons in the EU and non-
discrimination between EU nationals to recognize the same-sex marriage 
celebrated in France by two French nationals who had moved to Italy for the 
purpose of work. It must be stressed that the Naples Court of Appeal pointed 
out that the same solution would not have been possible, if the request for 
registration had been presented by an Italian same-sex couple who had 
celebrated their marriage abroad (as was the case in front of the Grosseto 
Tribunal). This distinction is clearly intended to prevent abuse of law which 
could have been perpetrated with the sole purpose of bypassing the 
restrictions of the Italian legal system which prohibits same-sex marriage. 
However, in my opinion, such legitimate considerations could not lead to 
exclude in any case – indeed automatically – the relevance of the above-
mentioned principles of the free movement of persons in the EU as well as 
non-discrimination against EU nationals. In fact, the right to free movement 
would be unreasonably hindered, at least when Italian same-sex couples are 
able to demonstrate a real and effective connection to the legal system where 
the marriage has been celebrated. 
                                                 
54 For a scrupulous criticism of the reasoning followed by the Decree of the Grosseto 
Tribunal, see Giacomo Biagioni, 'La trascrizione dei matrimoni same-sex conclusi 
all'estero nel recente provvedimento del Tribunale di Grosseto' (2014) 2 GenIUS 195. 
55 The Order of the Grosseto Tribunal has subsequently been declared invalid by the 
Florence Court of Appeal, Decree of 24 September 2014, because of procedural 
flaws. However, the trial was continued in front of the same Grosseto Tribunal 
which, in its Decree of 26 February 2015, requested again that the Registrar record 
such a marriage.  
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The gradual evolution of the Italian case law shows how the traditional 
concept of marriage comes under assault due to the pressure deriving from 
same-sex married couples in search of recognition of their legal status created 
abroad. 
 
V. THE SIGNALS THAT SHOW THAT THE WAY SAME-SEX IS 
PERCEIVED IN ITALY IS GRADUALLY CHANGING 
 
While it is true that the number of judicial decisions in favour of the 
recognition of same-sex marriages concluded abroad is limited, there is no 
doubt that the above-mentioned narrow openings have convinced more and 
more same-sex couples to seek the recognition of their marriage celebrated 
abroad and to challenge the refusal to record through legal action. 
 
This kind of bottom-up pressure has been recorded notwithstanding the 
strong reaction from the Italian Ministry of Home Affairs that, on 7 October 
2014, adopted a Circular reaffirming the prohibition on registration of 
foreign same-sex marriages in the national civil-status register. According to 
the Ministry, it is up to the national legislator to decide whether to bring 
same-sex marriages into line with those concluded between persons of 
opposite-sex and to allow the registration of these marriages in the national 
civil status register. 
 
It must be stressed that this Circular, by its nature, has no binding force and 
even its legality has been debated.56 In my view, regardless of whether the 
arguments followed by the Circular are well-founded, it is particularly 
important to underline that, subsequent to its publication, many more 
municipalities have challenged the ministerial prohibition and have either 
accepted requests for the registration of same-sex marriages or have 
announced their willingness to accept them.57 It is true that the records have 
                                                 
56 Different views are expressed by the Regional Administrative Court of Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, Judgment no 228 of 21 May 2015, and by the Council of State, 
Judgment no 4899 of 26 October 2015. 
57 This is the case in, eg, the Municipalities of Bologna, Fano, Leghorn, Milan, Naples, 
Pisa, Rome, Treviso. 
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later been declared null and void by the local representatives of the central 
administration,58 but it must be stressed that the respective orders have been 
challenged in the Italian courts and, at least in some cases, actions brought by 
same-sex couples have been upheld although solely on the ground of lack of 
competence of the representatives of the central administration.59 
 
Moreover, there is no doubt that the way same-sex marriage is perceived in 
Italy is gradually changing. Signals of this shift may be found in the case law 
of Italian courts, in some policy shifts by the Italian administration and also 
by the Italian legislature which, even before the adoption of Law 2016 no 76, 
although for specific – and limited – reasons, recognised same-sex unions or 
at least removed some obstacles which hinder their recognition. 
 
Firstly, the shifts mentioned have been recorded with regard to the issue of 
family reunification. In particular, a few Italian judgments60 declared 
unlawful a refusal to issue a residence permit to a third-country national who 
had married a same-sex Italian national in another EU Member State, and 
then applied for family reunification in Italy. The reasoning followed was 
that, once the creation of a matrimonial union in an EU Member State is 
proven, the principle of free movement of the EU citizen and of their family 
member has to be granted irrespective of the national law of the spouses. 
 
                                                 
58 This is the case with the Prefect of Rome (31 October 2004), of the Prefect of 
Bologna (3 November 2014) and the Prefect of Milan (5 November 2014). 
59 Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, Judgment no 3912 of 9 March 2015; 
Regional Administrative Court of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Judgment no 228 of 21 May 
2015; Regional Administrative Court of Tuscany, Judgment no 1291 of 25 September 
2015; Regional Administrative Court of Lombardy, Judgment no 2037 of 29 
September 2015. In contrast, more recently, the Council of State ruled that the 
Prefect has an implied power to declare null and void the unlawful acts adopted by 
the local administrations. See, Council of State, Judgment no 4899 of 26 October 
2015. 
60 Reggio Emilia Tribunal, Order of 13 February 2012, <http://www.meltingpot.org/IM 
G/pdf/trib-re-coniuge-omosex.pdf> and Pescara Tribunal, Order of 15 January 2013, 
<http://www.articolo29.it/decisioni/tribunale-di-pescara-ordinanza-del-15-
gennaio-2 
013/> both accessed 28 May 2016. 
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It is significant that the Ministry of Home Affairs, with its Circular of 26 
October 2012,61 took note of the solution adopted by this case law and 
affirmed that it had its logical antecedent in the judgment no 1328/2011 of the 
Italian Supreme Court. According to this judgment, the concept of 'spouse' 
for the purpose of a family reunification shall be evaluated according to the 
foreign legal system of the country where the same-sex marriage has been 
celebrated. This has the consequence that a person who has celebrated 
marriage to an EU citizen in an EU Member State, shall be considered a 
family member for the purpose of the right of residence. 
 
This increase in awareness about the issues concerning same-sex couples has 
also been confirmed by the reform of the law implementing Directive 
2004/38 on the free movement of citizens of the European Union and their 
family members.62 In particular, the original provision that the duty of the 
host Member State to facilitate the entry and residence of the partner with 
whom the EU citizen has a durable relationship was subordinate to the 
provision that the said stable relationship would be duly certified by the State 
of nationality of the EU citizen. Thus, the same-sex partner of an EU national 
was not included among the beneficiaries of the provision in case the 
legislation of his (or her) national State does not actually provide for the 
recognition of same-sex relationships. Bowing to the pressure of an 
infringement procedure opened by the European Commission,63 Italy erased 
the provision whereby certification would be issued by the EU Member State 
of nationality and now only requests that the stable relationship is sworn to 
in official documents. The official documents of the State of origin are 
therefore now admitted as sufficient evidence, with the result that one 
                                                 
61 Circular no 8996 of 26 October 2012. 
62 The Directive has been implemented by Legislative Decree no 30/2007. For 
comment, see Marcello Di Filippo, 'La libera circolazione dei cittadini comunitari e 
l'ordinamento italiano: (poche) luci e (molte) ombre nell'attuazione della Direttiva 
2004/38/CE' (2008) Rivista di diritto internazionale 420. The reform to which I refer 
in the text has been introduced by Law no 97/2013. 
63 See the infringement procedure no 20112053 commenced by the European 
Commission by formal notice on 28 October 2011 and closed on 10 December 2013. 
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obstacle to family reunification for such same-sex partners has been 
overcome.64 
 
Another indication of the slow evolution of the Italian legal position in favour 
of same-sex couples can be traced from the case law that admits the 
registration in Italy of the birth certificate of a child born to a same-sex 
couple married in a State where such a union is allowed,65 as well as from the 
recent case law that admits the stepchild adoption by a same-sex partner.66 
These decisions are of course informed by favor filiationis and have the goal 
of providing for the best interests of the child.67 Nonetheless, in my opinion, 
through this kind of case law the opposition to same-sex marriage is being 
progressively eroded. 
 
With the recent Law 2016 no 76, the Italian Parliament has decided to 
regulate civil unions for same-sex couples, but did not provide these latter 
with the option to marry. The new law is certainly less ambitious than its 
                                                 
64 See Ilaria Queirolo and Lorenzo Schiano Di Pepe, Lezioni di diritto dell'Unione europea 
e relazioni familiari (3rd edn, Giappichelli 2014) 171, 208 ff. For a practical application 
of the new version of Legislative Decree no 30/2007 as amended by Law no 97/2013, 
see Verona Tribunal, Order no 152/14 of 10 December 2014. 
65 Turin Court of Appeal, Decree of 29 October 2014, <http://www.questione 
giustizia.it/doc/Corte_Appello_Torino_sezione_famiglia_decreto_29.10.2014.pdf>; 
Milan Court of Appeal, Decree of 16 October 2015, <http://www.ilcaso.it/ 
giurisprudenza/archivio/13842.pdf>; Naples Court of Appeal, Decree of 30 March 
2016, <http://www.articolo29.it/corte-dappello-di-napoli-sentenza-del-30-marzo-
2016/>, all accessed 28 May 2016. 
66 See, recently, Italian Supreme Court, Judgment no 12962 of 22 June 2016. With this 
Judgment the Supreme Court dismissed an action brought by the Public Prosecutor 
against the Rome Court of Appeal, Judgment no 7127 of 23 December 2015, and 
consequently confirmed the decision of stepchild adoption originally delivered by 
Rome Juvenile Court, Judgment no 299 of 30 July 2014. For a usefull collection of the 
Italian case law that admits stepchild adoption by a same-sex partner, see 
<http://www.articolo29.it/adozione-in-casi-particolari-second-parent-
adoptionmerito/> accessed 3 July 2016. 
67 The need to value the best interest of the child as a guideline also for the recognition 
of adoptions by same-sex couples abroad, is stressed by Giulia Rossolillo, 'Spunti in 
tema di riconoscimento di adozioni omoparentali nell'ordinamento italiano' (2014) 
2 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 245, 252 ff. 
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original formulation and is the result of a political compromise that has been 
deemed necessary to convince the more traditional sections of the majority 
parties to accept the introduction of a legal regime for same-sex couples. 
 
With regard to the issue of recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated 
abroad, the Law 2016 no 76 – although limiting itself to delegating the 
regulation of the matter to the Italian Government – establishes the general 
principle according to which the Italian regulation on civil unions will be 
applicable to same-sex couples who have celebrated their marriage, or civil 
union, or some comparable form of partnership abroad. Through such a 
provision, same-sex marriages celebrated abroad will be subject to a 
downgrade in so far as they will be considered as only equivalent to civil 
unions as described in the Italian legal system. Irrespective of any assessment 
of the legality of such a downgrade,68 it is undisputable that the new law marks 
the abandonment of the theory according to which same-sex marriages 
celebrated abroad are incapable of producing any legal effect in the Italian 
legal system.  
 
Same-sex marriages can no longer be considered to be in contrast to public 
policy. This conclusion has already been supported by certain case law,69 
which has at the same time paradoxically affirmed the inability of same-sex 
marriages to produce any legal effect in Italy. Furthermore, in light of the 
other signals showing that the way in which such unions are perceived by the 
Italian legal system is gradually changing, it seems anachronistic to me to 
maintain the view that same-sex marriage could be considered in contrast to 
the fundamental values of Italian society and thus to the public policy clause. 
 
VI. FINAL REMARKS: THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE 
 
It has not been many years since same-sex marriages celebrated abroad were 
considered non-existent in the Italian legal system. Such an opinion, 
however, was no longer defensible, according to the ECtHR case law and the 
                                                 
68 However, the issue of the legality of such a downgrade will be dealt with in Section 
VI. 
69 Italian Supreme Court, Judgments no 2400 of 9 February 2015; Regional 
Administrative Court of Lazio, Judgment no 3912 of 9 March 2015. 
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EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. For this reason, since the judgment no 
4184/2012 of the Italian Supreme Court, the Italian courts started to justify 
the impossibility of registration of a marriage celebrated abroad as a 
consequence of its inability to produce any legal effect – as a marriage – in the 
Italian legal system. Apart from the doubts that arise from such a legal 
category, the reasoning that might lead to the non-recognition of same-sex 
marriage essentially entails public policy considerations. 
 
The content of this traditional exception to the operation of conflict of law 
rules depends on the values that the internal legal system considers to be 
fundamental in a certain historical period. Although Italy is not obliged to 
introduce the possibility of celebrating same-sex marriages into its legal 
system, it may no longer underestimate the increasing relevance – at the 
European level – of the principle of recognition of the status created abroad. 
In particular, that principle has been affirmed within the framework of the 
EU law in order to ensure the free movement of persons within the territory 
of the Member States. At the same time, any failure to recognize a status 
validly created abroad (even in a non-European country) could raise concerns 
about the commitment to the fundamental right of respect for private and 
family life, as set out in article 8 ECHR. 
 
However, I stressed that the stability of the status created abroad has not yet 
been specifically affirmed with regard to the recognition of same-sex 
marriages neither by the ECJ nor by the ECtHR. Thus, in any case, the 
stability of the status is not an absolute value. In fact, according to the ECJ, 
public policy considerations might justify national restriction measures and 
thus a refusal to recognize the status created abroad. Similarly, the ECtHR 
found that recognition of the status might be excluded following a fair 
balancing of conflicting values. 
 
With the adoption of the Italian Law 2016 no 76 on civil unions the stability 
of the status created abroad through same-sex marriages is not granted. In 
fact, such marriages will be treated as equivalent to a civil union according to 
the Italian legal system. This outcome certainly represents a step forward 
compared to the previous affirmation that same-sex marriages could not 
produce any legal effect in the Italian legal system: it follows from the above 
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that same-sex marriages are no longer considered in contrast with public 
policy. Nonetheless, this solution is still not the same as affirming the full 
recognition of a same-sex marriage celebrated abroad.  
 
One may wonder if the downgrade created by the law on civil unions might 
be considered in line with the supranational context I discussed above. 
Despite the fact that Italy was not legally obliged to introduce same-sex 
marriages into its legal system, there is no doubt that the solution envisaged 
by the new law implies the creation of a limping status for same-sex couples, 
having regard to the fact that they are considered married by the State where 
the marriage was celebrated, yet are only considered bound by a civil union 
when they move to Italy. 
 
In order to verify if such a limping status, besides being undesirable in itself, 
contravenes EU free movement rights as well as the right to private and 
family life, a case-by-case approach should be followed. From this 
perspective, if EU same-sex couples are able to demonstrate a real and 
effective connection to the legal system where the marriage has been 
celebrated, their new status ought not to be perceived as a mere consequence 
of their will to overcome the actual limits of the Italian legal system and they 
could affirm that the downgrade of their marriage to a civil union entails an 
obstacle to their right of free movement (when the marriage has been 
celebrated in another EU Member State). In certain cases, they could also 
affirm a violation of their right to respect for their private and family life: 
while it is true that their relationship would at least produce the effects of a 
civil union, together with the rights and duties that the Italian legal order 
attaches to this status, nonetheless these rights and duties are not exactly the 
same as those which derive from a marriage. For example, the downgrade will 
represent a hurdle to the recognition in Italy of the rights and duties that a 
married partner has acquired in the State of origin towards the biological son 
or daughter of his or her partner. 
 
Otherwise, if Italian same-sex couples (and couples consisting of an Italian 
partner and a citizen of another country) go abroad only to get married and 
have no genuine link with the country where the union is formalized, they will 
then have fewer chances to challenge the downgrade of their marriage to a 
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civil union by invoking EU free movement rights and/or the right to private 
and family life. In fact, their behaviour could be perceived as an abuse of the 
right and for this reason could hardly be considered worthy of protection. 
 
From a normative point of view the issue of recognition of same-sex marriage 
is not yet completely resolved. Considering that 11 EU countries grant same-
sex couples the right to get married,70 the situation may arise more and more 
frequently where same-sex couples who celebrate their marriage abroad will 
submit requests to the Italian authorities to register such marriages. Many of 
them will not be satisfied that their marriage will qualify as a civil union and 
new litigation will probably arise with the effect of putting pressure on the 
Italian authorities. From a purely legal point of view, not all the arguments 
favour same-sex couples' expectations. However, as the recent Italian case 
law described within this paper has shown, the effect of a bottom-up 
dynamic, where the increasing movement of persons boosts the circulation 
of new models of family, should be in itself a key driver for a (real) new 
approach by the Italian authorities to the matter, to face up to the demands 
and expectations of a constantly evolving society. I believe that this bottom-
up dynamic will help Italy move forward with more courage towards a 
complete equalisation of different kinds of couples, which, in my opinion, 
will only be achieved by granting the right to marry to same-sex couples. 
 
                                                 
70 It must be specified that, as of the day of writing, same-sex marriage is possible in the 
following 10 EU countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (excluding 
Northern Ireland). Furthermore, in Finland, the law on same-sex marriage will enter 
into force on 1 March 2017. 
